Does Turkey want a divided Iraq?

The partition of Iraq was a nightmare scenario for Ankara long before the United States invaded and dismantled Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. The overriding fear always centered on the prospect of an independent Kurdistan emerging, should Iraq breakup and fall apart.

The belief was that this situation would automatically agitate Turkey’s own Kurds to push for self-determination, with the aim of ultimately joining their independent brothers across the border in northern Iraq. Today we have a slightly different picture in the region.

Iraqi Kurdistan may still be part of Iraq, but is enjoying a kind of autonomy that almost amounts to independence. While the “dream” of a truly independent Kurdistan prevails among Kurds, those in northern Iraq are also aware that they have never had it so good.

Put another way, “political adventurism” is the last thing the Kurdish leadership in Iraq would want to engage in under these circumstances. In the meantime, things have changed radically for them in terms of their relations with Turkey, which were not merely turbulent, but downright bellicose, in the past.

However, Ankara has now overcome many of its elemental fears and established good ties with the region’s Kurdish administration. A clear indication of this is the opening of a Consulate General in Erbil, which acts as an embassy of sorts.

In addition to this, Iraqi president Jalal Talabani (one of two key Kurdish leaders in the country) and Massoud Barzani, the head of the regional Kurdish government, have become honored guests in the Turkish capital. No longer are they subjected to the vilification they suffered from Turkish officials only a few years ago for allegedly backing PKK terrorism and Kurdish separatism.

This altered situation, together with the emergence of Turkey as an important regional player, is now leading to some odd commentary in the Arab press about Ankara’s alleged new Iraq policy. A case in point is an article by Amir Taheri, the internationally renowned Iranian born journalist and writer.

Writing in the Arabic English language newspaper Asharq Alawsat (“Kurdish Self Determination: The Good and the Better,” Dec. 31), Taheri argued: “As long as a despot was in power in Baghdad, a united Iraq suited Turkish interests.”

Referring to Turkey’s frequent cross-border incursions into northern Iraq in the past, in pursuit of Kurdistan Worker’s Party, or PKK, elements there, he went on to maintain that a democratic Iraq is unlikely to tolerate such incursions for long. Here is what Taheri goes on to say on the subject:

“Thus today, as neo-Ottomans in Turkey pursue dreams of empire, Ankara may be tilting towards a new position that favors the break up of Iraq. After all, the Ottoman Empire was made possible by the fact that the Arabs were divided into countless mini emirates or had no states of their own. A mini-Kurdish state in northern Iraq would have no choice but kowtow to Ankara even if that meant continued Turkish military incursion into its territory.”

These are loaded remarks and provide us with a clear indication of the kind of signals that regional experts are receiving from Ankara’s increasingly assertive policies in the Middle East.

The problem with these grand assertions is that Ankara has as much leeway in terms of engaging in adventurism in the region as the Kurds of northern Iraq have. Putting its hand into the hornets nest with imperial pretensions and utilizing the “divide and conquer” principle would in many instances increase Ankara’s problems with its own Kurds, not reduce them.

Taheri actually points to this too in his article, saying that the regional powers that favor the partition of Iraq would also end up as losers in the end. “All those states include within their frontiers a wide variety of ethnic minorities, including Kurds, who might be interested in their own versions of “self determination,”” he wrote.

It is obvious that the government in Turkey knows this too, therefore one must say Taheri goes too far in assuming that an Ankara, blinded with neo-Ottoman dreams of empire, has suspended judgment and is on the verge of embarking on a potentially self-destructive political adventure with no certain outcome.

After all, we are dealing with a Turkey that is trying to solve its own Kurdish problem, which has taken on a new dimension these days with all the current talk about autonomy for Turkish Kurds – a prospect that sends shivers up nationalist spines. It is clear that a partitioned Iraq would add fresh fuel to Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and depth to the country’s existing trauma.

It is not for nothing, after all, that Prime Minister Erdogan has changed tack in the past weeks by adopting a hard-line nationalistic approach to the Kurdish problem, after having presented himself, until recently, as a champion of Kurdish rights.

He is clearly aware of the political risk to his party and himself if he does not do this in an election year. He will no doubt try now to do a subtle balancing act in order not to loose too many votes in the predominantly Kurdish southeast, while also vying for nationalist votes elsewhere in the country.

The picture we are seeing currently is in fact of a Turkey that is still maintaining a policy based on ensuring that Iraq remains intact at all costs, while at the same time developing ties with all three elements that go into making up the country, namely the Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis.

As to Taheri’s contention that “A mini-Kurdish state in northern Iraq would have no choice but kowtow to Ankara,” Iraqi Kurdistan’s economic dependence on Turkey is already tangible evident. However, this is not forcing the Kurds into kowtowing to Turkey but providing them with important opportunities for economic development and they know it.

In recognition of this the Iraqi Kurdish leadership is trying to play a moderating role over the more radicalized of Turkey’s Kurds, by telling them the days of armed struggle are over and by encouraging them to move along the democratic path.

It is clear that both Talabani and Barzani would rather have constructive relations with Ankara based on mutual respect and equality than a relationship of tension, as in the past. This is why it is hard to understand Taheri’s contention that Turkey wants a divided Iraq.

He mentions Iran, Syria and even Jordan in his article as countries that would benefit from a divided Iraq. Whatever the merits of his arguments as far as these countries are concerned, the benefits that Turkey would supposedly draw from an Iraq that has fallen apart are not as clear to us as they appear to be to Taheri

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=does-turkey-want-a-divided-iraq-2011-01-03